Nathan H. Merrill v. Utah Labor Commission, Vermax of Flordia, Inc., Workers Compensation Fund, and  Wausau Business Insurance : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Nathan H. Merrill v. Utah Labor Commission,
Vermax of Flordia, Inc., Workers Compensation
Fund, and Wausau Business Insurance : Brief of
Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Phillip B. Shell; Day, Shell and Liljenquist; counsel for petitioner.
Eugene C. Miller Jr.; Sharon J. Eblen; Alan L. Hennebold; Counsel for Respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Merrill v. Utah Labor Commission, Vermax of Flordia, Inc., Workers Compensation Fund, and Wausau Business Insu, No.
20070584 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/392
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
-—00O00—-
NATHAN H. MERRILL : 
Petitioner,
 : Supreme Court Case No 20070584 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, VERMAX
 : 
OF FLORIDA, INC. dba DAKOTA 
CABINETS; WORKERS COMPENSATION . 
FUND; and WAUSAU BUSINESS 
INSURANCE, 
Respondents. 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Counsel for Respondent Vermax of Florida, Counsel for Petitioner Nathan H. Merrill 
Inc./Wausau Business Insurance 
Phillip B. Shell (03861) 
Sharon J. Eblen Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C. 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 45 East Vine Street 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 Murray, UT 84107 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Vermax of Florida, Inc./Workers 
Compensation Fund 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84157-0929 
Counsel for Respondent Labor Commission 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Office of Legal Counsel
 p n 
Utah Labor Commission ' "" .-.p QOVJf^ S 
P.O. Box 146615
 uTfcH APP E U J M 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 . »u \ 7 2Q0S 
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 O 0 0 - — 
NATHAN H. MERRILL : 
Petitioner, : Supreme Court Case No 20070584 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, VERMAX
 : 
OF FLORIDA, INC. dba DAKOTA 
CABINETS; WORKERS COMPENSATION . 
FUND; and WAUSAU BUSINESS 
INSURANCE, 
Respondents. 
- — 0 0 O 0 0 — 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Counsel for Respondent Vermax of Florida, Counsel for Petitioner Nathan H. Merrill 
Inc./Wausau Business Insurance 
Phillip B. Shell (03861) 
Sharon J. Eblen Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C. 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 45 East Vine Street 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 Murray, UT 84107 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Vermax of Florida, Inc./Workers 
Compensation Fund 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84157-0929 
Counsel for Respondent Labor Commission 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Office of Legal Counsel 
Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 5 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
PROCEDURE 6 
FACTS 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 12 
Under the Deferential Standard of Review, There Must be a 
Legitimate Purpose for the Act and a Reasonable Relationship 
To The Discrimination Imposed Therein 
POINT II 14 
Background and Basis of Workers' Compensation, Social 
Security Disability and Social Security Old Age Benefit Offsets 
Shows the Classes Involved in the Statute in Question to be 
Similarly Situated 
POINT III 21 
l 
There is No Relationship Between Cutting a Disabled Senior 
Citizen's Workers' Compensation Benefits and any Legitimate 
Purpose for the Statute 
CONCLUSION 31 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 33 
APPENDIX 34 
a. Order on Motion for Review 
b. Court of Appeals Opinion 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Pages 
Boan v. Richardson. 482 S.E. 2d 162 (W.Va. 1996) 24, 25, 27 
Gallivan v. Walker. 54 P.3d 1069, 2002 UT 89 (UT2002) 12, 21 
Golden v. Westark Community College. 
969 S.W. 2d 154 (Ark 1998) 21, 34 
Masich v. U.S. Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 191 P.2d 612, 113 Utah 
101(UT1948) 27 
Malan v. Lewis. 
693P.2d669(UT1984) 12,13 
Merrill v. Labor Commission . 
CA 2007 UT App 214(Ut Ct. App 2007) 23 
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry. 156 P.2d 885, 101 Utah 1, 7 (UT 
1945) 27,30 
2 
Park Utah Consolidated Mines v. Industrial Commission. 
36P.2d979(UT1934) 27,29 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 2002 UT 42, 48 P.3d 941 (UT 2002) 5, 13 
Pierce v. LaFourche Parish Council. 762 So.2d 608 (LA 2000) 23, 24 
Reesor v. Montana State Fund. 2004 MT 370 (MT 2004) 29 
Richardson v. Belcher. 404 U.S. 78 (1971) 24 
Romero v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office. 902 P.2d 896 (Co. App., Div 
I, 1995) 24, 31 
Sasso v. Ram Property Management. 
431 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) 24, 26 
State v. Merrill. 2005 UT 34 (UT 2005) 13 
Wood v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center. 
67 P.3d 436 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002) 12 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16 (1988) 4 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(2) (1997) 21, 28 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(5) (1997) 16, 19 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68(4) (1987) 14,15,16 
20 CFR 404.408 15 
42U.S.C.402 20 
42, U.S.C. 403(e) 20 
3 




Jurisdiction is grounded in the Utah Supreme Court in this 
matter pursuant to Section 63-46b-16, U.C.A. and Rule 45, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(5) violates the 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions by 
discriminating on the basis of age. 
Put in other words, does a reduction of permanent total 
disability benefits under workers' compensation by one-half of the sum of 
old age social security insurance payable to a claimant result in an 
unreasonable classification under the uniform operation of laws and equal 
protection clauses contained in the Utah and United States Constitutions 
without having a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
Workers Compensation Act? 
This constitutional issue was raised at the Utah Labor 
Commission level. (R. at 154-155 ). 
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The standard of review of a constitutional issue that does not 
involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications is deferential. 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 2002 UT 42, 48 P.3d 941 (UT 2002)/ 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
14th Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, (emphasis added) 
Section 34A-2-413(5), Utah Code Annotated (1997): 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in 
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the 
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received 
compensation from the employer or the employer's 
insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall 
be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the 
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security 
retirement benefits received by the employee during 
the same period. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURE 
1. Mr. Nathan Merrill filed an Application for 
Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission against Vermax of 
Florida, Inc., dba Dakota Cabinet and Mill on February 21, 
2003. He alleged two workplace injuries with that employer: 
May 14, 1998 and April 13, 2001. (R. at 1-7). 
2. Following an evidentiary hearing, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were issued on April 29, 
2004 by the Utah Labor Commission wherein interim Permanent 
Total Disability benefits were awarded against Wausau 
Insurance, who insured Vermax for the May 14, 1998 injury. 
No liability was found against the subsequent carrier, the 
Workers Compensation Fund, for the April 13, 2001 injury. (R. 
at 19-34). 
3. The Utah Labor Commission issued a final 
Order on May 12, 2004 (R. at 35-40). 
4. A Motion for Review was filed by Wausau 
on June 1, 2004 contesting its liability for the PTD benefits and 
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also concerning its right to submit a so-called re-employment 
plan. (R. at 41-55). 
5. An Order Granting the Motion for Review in 
part and an Order of Remand was issued by the Utah Labor 
Commission on January 31, 2005. (R. at 65-69) wherein the 
liability of Wausau for PTD benefits was affirmed, however the 
Labor Commission afforded Wausau the opportunity to submit a 
re-employment plan. 
6. On February 1, 2005 an order concerning 
Wausau's right to submit a re-employment plan was issued by 
the Labor Commission. (R. at 71-73). 
7. On March 24, 2005 a Final Order was issued 
by the Labor Commission. (R. at 78-83). 
8. Wausau filed a Motion for Review on that 
order on April 7, 2005. (R. at 84-87). 
9. The Labor Commission issued an Order of 
Remand on February 1, 2006. (R. at 105-107). Following that 
order, a date was set for a hearing concerning the issues of credit 
for disability benefits paid against a PTD award and concerning 
whether after payment of the first 312 weeks of PTD benefits 
7 
whether the insurance carrier is entitled to a reduction against 
such compensation of an amount representing 50% of any Social 
Security retirement benefits received by the injured worker. (R. 
at 109-110) 
10. The Utah Labor Commission issued a 
Supplemental Order on Remand on May 17, 2006. (R. at 131-
137). 
11. Petitioner filed a Motion for Review on June 
7, 2006 concerning the constitutionality of the so-called reverse 
offset statute found in Section 34A-2-413(5), Utah Code 
Annotated. (R. at 138-142). 
12. An Order Denying Motion for Review was 
issued by the Utah Labor Commission on June 29, 2006. (R. at 
154-156) 
13. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the 
Utah Court of Appeals on July 28, 2006. 
14. The Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
Opinion on June 21 2007 wherein it affirmed the 
constitutionality of Section 34A-2-413(5) and upheld the 
determination of the Utah Labor Commission. 
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FACTS 
1. Petitioner Nathan Merrill sustained a low 
back injury at work on May 14, 1998 while employed by 
Vermax of Florida, Inc. (dba Dakota Cabinet and Mill). At that 
time, he was 60 years old. 
2. At that time Vermax was insured, for 
workers compensation purposes, by Wausau Business Insurance. 
3. Pursuant to a Labor Commission approved 
compensation agreement, he was paid a total of $6,770.40 for a 
7% PPD rating commencing October 29, 1999. This was 
equivalent to $310 per week for 21.84 weeks. 
4. Mr. Merrill sustained a temporary 
aggravation of the underlying back condition at work for the 
same employer on April 13, 2001. At that time Vermax was 
insured by the Workers Compensation Fund. Following the 
injury, he continued to work, albeit with increasing difficulty. 
5. He stopped working due to his injuries on 
August 28, 2001. 
6. Permanent Total Disability (PTD) benefits of 
$395.00 per week were subsequently awarded by the Utah Labor 
9 
Commission, effective August 28, 2001 based upon the May 14, 
1998 injury. As of August 2001, Mr. Merrill was 63 years old. 
(R. at 32). 
7. Mr. Merrill is currently 68 years old and is 
receiving Social Security retirement benefits. 
8. Prior to receiving retirement benefits from 
the Social Security Administration, Mr. Merrill received Social 
Security disability benefits. These were paid after August of 
2001 and until he reached full retirement age, at which point 
disability benefits stopped and retirement benefits began, 
although the amount paid by the Social Security Administration 
remained the same. 
9. Under the terms of the final order of the Utah 
Labor Commission, after Mr. Merrill had received six years of 
PTD benefits, on his birthday in August of 2007, because he is 
receiving Social Security retirement benefits, his PTD benefits 
were reduced by 50% of the amount of his monthly Social 
Security retirement check. This reduces his net income by about 
20%. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 34A-2-413(5), U.C.A. violates Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution as well as Section 1 of the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution in that it treats 
people differently within the classes created by the statute 
without having a reasonable tendency to further the objectives 
of the Workers Compensation Act. Nor does it have a 
There are significant differences between Social Security 
Disability and Social Security Old Age Insurance benefits, with 
one being a wage replacement program that can coordinate with 
workers' compensation benefits, and the latter being an old-age 
pension that can be supplemented by continued employment. 
Section 34a-2-413(5) is wholly at odds with the purpose 
of our workers' compensation system. It erodes the financial 
integrity of our senior citizens who are disabled and unable to 
work to supplement their incomes. 
While preventing duplication of benefits and reducing the 
cost of worker' compensation insurance can be legitimate 
governmental purposes, the means chosen to achieve those 
n 
purposes - the offset required by Section 34A-2-413(5) - is not 
rationally related to those purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Under the Deferential Standard of Review, There 
Must be a Legitimate Purpose for the Act and a 
Reasonable Relationship To The Discrimination 
Imposed Therein 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the Uniform 
Operation of Law Clause, is considered to be the Utah equivalent of the 
federal equal protection guarantee in the 14th Amendment that "persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." Wood v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2002), and Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 669 (Utah 1984). 
In order for a law to be constitutional under the uniform 
operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, there should be no 
discrimination within a class, but rather the classification should operate 
uniformly on all persons similarly situated within the class. Gallivan v. 
Walker. 54 P.3d 1069, 2002 UT 89 (UT 2002). 
Under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, a two-
part test is used in the analysis of determining uniform operation of the 
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laws: "First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. 
Second, the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the 
classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute. Malan v. Lewis at 670. 
Stated in other words, the deferential standard or rational basis 
level of scrutiny is the applicable one when considering discrimination in a 
statute based on the age of the individual because the statute does not 
infringe upon a fundamental right or create suspect classifications. 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 2002 UT 42, 48 P.3d 941 (UT 2002). This 
requires that the classification in question be reasonable, the legislative 
objectives be legitimate and there be a reasonable relationship between the 
two. Peterson, supra at ^23. 
The first prong of the analysis presupposes the creation of 
classes within a law and requires a consideration of the level of scrutiny 
applied to the discrimination inherent in any classification. In State v. 
Merrill 2005 UT 34 (UT 2005), this Court affirmed that: 
Every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The 
Legislature cannot in one act legislate as to all persons or all 
subject matters. It is inclusive as to some class or group and as 
to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and 
exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be 
unconstitutional, the discrimination must be unreasonable or 
arbitrary. A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary 
in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some 
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basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters 
included as compared to those excluded from its operation 
provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act. 
This does not give the legislature a blank check to write 
any legislation that it desires and expect it to pass constitutional 
muster even under the deferential standard. Rather there must be a 
real and reasonable relationship between the discrimination imposed 
by the law and what the act might reasonable be expected to 
accomplish. 
POINT II 
Background and Basis of Workers' Compensation, Social 
Security Disability and Social Security Old Age Benefit 
Offsets Shows the Classes Involved in the Statute in 
Question to be Similarly Situated 
We submit that there is no valid basis between 
differentiating between permanent total disability benefit recipients 
who are older than age 65 and those who are younger. 
Prior to 1988, once PTD benefits were awarded by the 
Labor Commission, they were essentially set for the life of the 
injured worker. The Workers Compensation Act provided that any 
person who was awarded PTD benefits by the Utah Labor 
Commission could receive those benefits, without reduction, for life. 
14 
Section 35-1-68, U.C.A. 
Persons receiving PTD benefits (or any compensation 
under the workers' compensation act) who also received Social 
Security disability benefits were subject to the offset provisions of 
the Social Security Act such that their Social Security disability 
benefits would be reduced if the individual was also receiving 
workers' compensation benefits and the combined SSDI and WC 
benefits exceeded 80% of the person's average current earnings 
(ACE) as defined by law. Section 404.408 CFR.1 
Under the old statute, at full retirement age (age 65), the 
Social Security offset would stop (because Social Security disability 
benefits would stop) and the permanently totally disabled worker 
could receive full Social Security old-age insurance benefits along 
with his continuing PTD benefits without reduction. 
In 1988, the Utah Legislature made a new and 
l 
The procedure for determining the maximum amount of workers' compensation benefits that 
can be received before an offset would be made against Social Security disability benefits involves 
looking at the last five years that a person worked before becoming disabled. The best earnings year in 
that five year period is taken and the monthly average is determined by dividing the year's gross income 
by 12. That resulting number is called the ACE (average current earnings). An alternative method that 
can be used in determining the ACE is to look at any consecutive five year period during a person's work 
life and to then divide by 60. If the resulting number gives a higher average than the average month in 
the last year's earnings, then that number can be used as the person's ACE. Once the ACE is determined, 
80% of that number will equal the maximum amount of Social Security disability benefits and workers' 
compensation benefits that a person can receive during any given month. If the sum of the two exceeds 
80% of the ACE, then Social Security disability benefits will be reduced until the 80% of ACE figure is 
not exceeded. 20 CFR 404.408. 
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significant change to the forerunner of current Section 34A-2-
413(5), U.C.A., which was Section 35-1-68(4), U.C.A. It required 
that after a permanently disabled worker had received 312 weeks of 
any combination of disability benefits, and after he or she had begun 
to receive Social Security old-age insurance benefits, that the 
monthly PTD amount would automatically be reduced by 50% of 
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the injured 
worker during the same period. 
There is no requirement in the statute for a reduction of 
PTD benefits due to the receipt of any other kind of public or private 
retirement or pension benefit, but only for Social Security old-age 
benefits (sometimes referred to as O.A.S.L - old age survivor 
insurance, but commonly called retirement benefits). 
How much a person is paid in Social Security disability 
and/or old-age benefits depends upon the earnings history of the 
worker. After a disabled worker begins to receive Social Security 
disability benefits, that basic benefit amount, before any offset by 
Social Security for workers' compensation benefits received, 
remains the same once the individual reaches full retirement age. 
Any offset taken by Social Security at that time ends 
16 
and a full benefit check is paid each month. Depending upon the 
earnings history of the worker, he may or may not receive Social 
Security disability benefits but still may receive old-age benefits 
once the appropriate age is reached. This can depend upon when the 
person became disabled, the length of time that the worker paid into 
the Social Security system, and other factors. 
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/ssa-hbk.htm. 
For example, normally, a person must have at least 40 
work credits in order to be qualified for disability benefits (assuming 
he is disabled and meets the medical requirements for disability). A 
credit is earned for each calendar quarter of a year that the person 
works and pays into the Social Security system. For each quarter of 
a year that a person does not work or pay into the system, a credit is 
lost. After five years of not working or paying into the system, a 
person may become uninsured for disability purposes and despite 
becoming disabled, will not be able to receive Social Security 
disability benefits. www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/ ssa-hbk.htm. 
Under the statute in question, at full-retirement age, 
provided that the disabled worker has received 312 weeks of PTD 
benefits, any Social Security disability offset ends and under current 
17 
Utah law a disabled worker's PTD check is reduced by half of the 
monthly Social Security retirement check. The results can vary 
widely. 
The Petitioner's situation provides a good example. 
Mr. Merrill was paid $27.50 per hour as a full-time employee at 
Vermax. He earned about $57,200.00 per year. Under the formula 
referred to above, he had a monthly ACE of $4,766.00. 80% of that 
ACE is $3,813.00. Had he been on SSDI after he became disabled, 
he would have received about $1,100.00 per month in SSDI benefits. 
The Labor Commission order awarded him PTD benefits that total 
$1,710.00 per month. These Social Security disability and PTD 
benefits add up to $2,810.00 per month. Because this sum is less 
than his ACE, there is no Social Security disability offset. 
Mr. Merrill is age 68 and receives Social Security 
retirement benefits of about $1,100.00 per month. After August 
2007, the point at which he had received 312 weeks of PTD benefits, 
under the operation of section 34A-2-413(5), U.C.A. he experienced 
an immediate cut of about $550.00 per month from his PTD benefits 
because of the offset mandated by Section 34A-2-413(5). 
This means his net income was cut by 20% merely because he 
18 
reached retirement age. And because he is disabled, he has no 
option of working to supplement his monthly income. 
Through no fault of his own but because of an injury at 
work, instead of continuing to be able to earn as much as $50,000 
per year in a skilled occupation, plus receive Social Security 
disability benefits, his income was first cut to about $33,720 per year 
in PTD and SSDI benefits. 
Then, after the offset mandated by Section 34A-2-
413(5), in August of 2007 his annualized income dropped another 
$6,000.00 and he is now receives only about $27,000 per year in 
reduced PTD and regular Social Security retirement benefits. The 
only difference being that he is over the age of 65. 
People in situations similar to Mr. Merrill, but who are 
otherwise much younger than him when their PTD benefits begin, 
who earned a good income before the injury, can receive full SSDI 
benefits and PTD benefits for any number of years until retirement 
age is reached - with no reduction until then. When the reduction is 
made, the only factor that triggers it is the person's age. 
Section 34A-2-413(5), U.C.A. deals with a class of 
people who receive PTD benefits. For analysis, we assume that all 
19 
injured workers entitled to workers compensation PTD benefits are 
similarly situated. This is because, regardless of age, they have all 
suffered a work place injury resulting in permanent disability and 
their recourse for their loss of ability to work due to the impact of 
that injury is limited solely to the provisions of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation (or Occupational Disease) Act. 
In this class there is a subgroup of those totally disabled 
workers eligible for PTD benefits who are under age 65 and will 
qualify for Social Security retirement upon reaching age 65. The 
second subclass consists of PTD claimants who are age 65 or older 
and are Social Security retirement recipients. The chronological age 
of the worker is the only distinguishing factor between the two 
subclasses. 
Although the statute does not specifically mention age, 
nevertheless it treats injured workers over age 65 differently than 
persons under age 65 and results in age based discrimination. 
A person's age and their eligibility for Social Security old-age 
insurance benefits are both unrelated to their ability to engage in 
regular steady or meaningful employment. 42 U.S.C. 402 and 
403(E). 
20 
We submit that for these reasons, these classes are 
similarly situated for uniform operation of laws/equal protection 
analysis. Hence, the question is whether these classifications are 
discriminatory. If so, the analysis will center on whether this is 
constitutionally permissible - is the legislative purpose legitimate 
and does the statute further that purpose. Gallivan, paragraph 43, 
supra. 
Point III 
There is No Relationship Between Cutting a Disabled 
Senior Citizen's Workers' Compensation Benefits and 
any Legitimate Purpose for the Statute 
A person who is in PTD status receives a certain 
amount of monthly benefits under the workers compensation system 
- two thirds of their pre-injury wages up to a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage for the year in which they were 
injured. 34A-2-413(2)(a), U.C.A. After reaching age 65 and 
beginning to receive O.A.S.I. benefits, and if six years of PTD 
benefits have already been paid, the disabled worker's income will 
be immediately reduced by half of his monthly Social Security 
retirement check because of the statute in question. 
We note, however, those who do not receive Social 
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Security old-age benefits, but have a civil service pension or other 
old-age benefits, will receive those pensions as well as a full 
workers' compensation PTD check each month without offset, as the 
statute is silent about all other forms of retirement or old-age 
benefits. 
At full-retirement age when Social Security disability 
ends and old-age benefits begin for a worker who has paid into the 
federal system for enough quarters to qualify for benefits,, the able-
bodied receive their benefits and have the option of continuing to 
work as well to maintain their desired or needed income. 
However, those who are disabled by a work injury and 
are PTD do not have that option. They did not join their statutory 
classification by choice. They did not volunteer, but were forced 
there by virtue of physical or mental disability due to injury or 
accident in their employment. They cannot work. They have no 
wage earning capacity. And those in this classification who receive 
Social Security retirement benefits have forced upon them a 
permanent reduction in their net income because of the operation of 
Section 34A-2-413(5), with no means to make up for the loss. 
In justification of the disparate treatment given senior 
22 
citizens who are permanently disabled and receive reduced PTD 
benefits as well as Social Security old-age benefits, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the reduction in question has a rational basis 
because it allegedly helps avoid "duplication of benefits" and helps 
save the insurance industry money, allowing for reduced premiums. 
Merrill v. Labor Commission ,CA 2007 UT App 214 (See page 7 in 
Appendix below). 
However, there is no duplication of benefits when a 
disabled worker is receiving Social Security old-age benefits and 
PTD benefits. Workers compensation benefits are provided to 
compensate injured workers for loss of income resulting from work-
related injuries and are paid by employers under a statutory scheme 
in exchange for the employee's forbearance from suing the employer 
in tort. In contrast, O.A.S.I. benefits are provided to persons 
regardless of injury so long as the recipient has reached the statutory 
age, has been employed and has contributed to the Social Security 
Trust Fund. It follows that reducing workers' compensation benefits 
for persons who are also receiving O.A.S.I. benefits is not rationally 
related to the goal of preventing duplicative benefits because the two 
types of benefits do not serve the same purpose. Pierce v. 
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LaFourche Parish Council 762 So.2d 608 (LA 2000). Also, see 
Boan v. Richardson. 482 S.E. 2d 162, 198 W.Va. 545( W.Va. 1996), 
Golden v. Westark Community College. 969 S.W. 2d 154, 333 Ark. 
41 (Ark. 1998), Romero v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office. 902 
P.2d 896 (Co. App., Div I, 1995) and Sasso v. Ram Property 
Management. 431 So. 2d 204 (Fla. App. 1983) 
Social Security disability benefits, available to persons 
under age 65, are intended as wage replacement, with benefits only 
being paid after it is determined by the Social Security 
Administration that the individual is not capable of significant 
gainful employment due to significant health reasons. Richardson 
v. Belcher. 404 U.S. 78 (1971). 
Because PTD benefits are also part of a plan for wage 
replacement, the coordination of these benefits is undertaken by 
Social Security so that a disabled individual is limited to receiving a 
total of 80% of his so-called average current earnings (ACE). Thus, 
if PTD and SSDI benefits total more than 80% of the person's ACE, 
then Social Security reduces the disability benefits down to that 
limit, but to not less than zero. 20 CFR 408. This was upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Belcher. 404 U.S. 78 
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(1971), to be constitutional and not a violation of equal protection. 
Social Security old-age insurance benefits, on the other 
hand, are retirement benefits earned by a lifetime of employment in 
the work force and by the attainment of age 62, 65 or older. 42 
U.S.C. §402(a) and 416(1)(1994). Since the year 2000 when then 
President Clinton signed the bill into law, a person receiving Social 
Security old-age benefits may be employed and earn any amount of 
money in wages without any offset against those old-age benefits. 42 
U.S.C. 402 and 403(E). The money paid for old-age retirement, to 
the extent that it actually does replace wages, does so by reason of a 
decision to retire rather than because of injury. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court in Boan v. 
Richardson, supra, concluded that the duplication argument is 
without a rational basis because the purposes behind workers' 
compensation and Social Security old-age retirement insurance are 
quite different. On the one hand, workers' compensation PTD 
benefits are for wage replacement due to a disabling work place 
injury, and on the other, old-age benefits provide additional 
compensation during retirement years based on one's life's work. 
The Boan court cited with approval a Florida case, 
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Sasso v. Ram Property Management, supra, which reasoned that: 
The common goal of all three compensating benefits does 
not necessarily support the E/C's thesis that O.A.S.I. 
benefits are primarily for the decent support of elderly 
workmen who have ceased to labor, (fn20) and are intended 
to insure that persons removed from the active labor market 
because of advanced age will enjoy comfortable retirement 
years predicated upon a modest, but adequate, income 
earned during their active employment years. A worker, 
however, aged 70 (now 65, since the year 2000) or older 
may still be fully employed and earn the full amount of 
O.A.S.I. benefits to which he would otherwise be entitled, if 
he were fully retired. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 403(f)(3) 
(Supp.1982). Thus, it appears to us that O.A.S.I. benefits, 
although intended to assist a worker in his retirement, have 
evolved into a benefit that is more attributable to advanced 
years rather than to retirement or wage-loss. We therefore 
fail to see how wage-loss disability benefits and O.A.S.I. 
benefits can be considered duplicative. The lack of any 
commonality of purpose saps the statute of rationality, 
assuming its purpose is the avoidance of double-dipping. 
Accord, Cruz v. Chevrolet Grey Iron, Division of General 
Motors Corp., 398 Mich. 117, 247 N.W.2d 764, 782-783 
(1976) (Williams, J., dissenting). 
Sasso at 219. 
The court in Boan also noted that the two programs 
compute benefits on entirely different bases and compensate for 
completely different eventualities- old-age vs. disability. The Boan 
court also stated that a reduction of disability benefits to save the 
system money or to help preserve fiscal integrity fail rationality for 
the same reasons that the "classification of old age social security 
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recipients' is not a reasonable one, where the purpose of such 
classification is to impose a reduction of permanent total disability 
benefits in the pursuit of the goal of enhancing the fiscal integrity of 
the Workers' Compensation Fund." Boan at 551, 552. 
This distinction is further strengthened by the fact that 
in Utah, as in West Virginia and some other states, workers' 
compensation benefits are not considered welfare benefits. Rather, 
they are a substitute for access to the court for civil redress under the 
common law tort system. That has been the case since 1917 when 
workers' compensation statues in Utah abrogated a worker's right to 
a civil cause of action for workplace injuries. See Masich v. U.S. 
Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 191 P.2d 612, 113 Utah 101 
(Utah 1948). Further, workers' compensation is grounded not in 
contract, but rather in the police power - the right of the state to 
regulate the status of employment relationships and the general 
welfare of the people. Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 
P.2d 885, 101 Utah 1, 7 (Utah 1945), citing Park Utah Mines v. 
Industrial Commission, supra. 
These factors make workers' compensation benefits 
more than just wage replacement. They are not welfare benefits, nor 
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are they attributable to a person's age. Benefits are also affected by 
more than a person's pre-injury wages, but also involve limitations 
based on average wages in the State of Utah. Section 34A-2-413(2), 
U.C.A. 
States that considered the constitutionality of the offset 
issue prior to the year 2000 when the limitation on wages earned 
while receiving Social Security old-age benefits was removed, as 
cited above, often used coordination of benefits, or avoidance of so-
called "double dipping" as a basis for upholding their various 
statutes. Perhaps before the change in Social Security laws in the 
year 2000, O.A.S.I. benefits could have been considered wage 
replacement to one degree or another because there was a reduction 
of old-age benefits based upon post retirement earnings. Initially the 
age did not matter, if you worked, benefits were scaled back, but a 
subsequent amendment to 42 U.S.C. 402 in 1994 applied this to 
working recipients of retirement benefits only to age 70, after that 
age there was no penalty for continuing to work and receive O.A.S.I. 
benefits. 
Under current federal law, because section 34A-2-
413(5) offsets against Social Security old-age benefits, which is now 
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a retirement or pension system and not a wage replacement system, 
as the Social Security disability program is (see Richardson, supra) 
the means are not justified under either the Utah State constitution or 
the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Reesor v. Montana 
State Fund, 2004 MT 370 (Mont. 2004), has also recognized the lack 
of a rational basis for statutory provisions that limit workers 
compensation benefits to senior citizens receiving Social Security 
old-age benefits. The court in Reesor agreed that old-age benefits 
are not wage loss benefits but are based on different principles and 
programs. Reesor considered whether the objective of the statute in 
question there (coordination of wage loss benefits) bears a rational 
relationship to the classification adopted by the legislature in light of 
the purposes of the workers' compensation act, and found it did not. 
In Utah, while the language of the workers' 
compensation act itself does not seem to state the purpose of the act, 
case law helps in the enunciation of the basis for the legislation. The 
case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines v. Industrial Commission, 36 
P.2d 979 (Utah 1934) provides a good description. It was cited in 
Ortega where it was described as 
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a beneficent act, passed to protect employees and those 
dependent upon them, and to tax the costs of human 
wreckage against the industry which employs it, such 
burden being added to the price of the produce and 
thereby spread over the general consuming users of the 
product of the industry. 
Ortega at 7. 
The offset against disability benefits required by Section 34A-
2-413(5), U.C.A. is wholly at odds with the purpose of our workers' 
compensation system. It erodes the financial integrity of our senior 
citizens who are disabled and unable to work to supplement their incomes. 
While preventing duplication of benefits and reducing the cost 
of worker' compensation insurance can be legitimate governmental 
purposes, the means chosen to achieve those purposes - the offset required 
by Section 34A-2-413(5) - is not rationally related to those purposes. 
We note that the act allows a disabled worker to receive a 
minimum of six years of any combination of workers compensation 
benefits before the offset will apply. This delays the reduction of benefits 
for workers who are already receiving old-age benefits from Social 
Security or are less than six years away from age 65. However, it does not 
benefit younger workers who become permanently and totally disabled and 
are more than six years away from eligibility for receiving full old-age 
benefits. They are out of the work place and are not contributing further to 
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their Social Security pension, possibly resulting in a lower monthly amount 
of old-age benefits once they reach age 65 than they would have had had 
they been able to continue to work, and then at age 65 when old-age 
benefits are paid, their benefits are reduced by half of their monthly old-
age benefits check. 
The legislature may have written in the six-year guarantee to 
help avoid constitutional challenges that had arisen in other states where 
retirement-age workers were injured and the statute proposed to offset 
against PTD benefits, but not against TTD (temporary total disability), 
both paid for limited periods that can total up to six years, or PPD 
(permanent partial disability) benefits. See, for example, cases cited in 
Golden v. Westark, supra, and Romero v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 
supra. However, this does not save the statute from the disparate impact 
that it has on the classifications involved here but at most delays it in some 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we submit that the statute is constitutionally 
defective in creating a classification of Social Security retirement recipient 
and reducing benefits for those persons, that such classification, as here 
applied, bears no reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose 
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and that it results in all persons who have been awarded PTD benefits not 
being treated equally. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
32 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of January , 2008,1 caused to be 
mailed by first class mail, postage pre-paid, two (2) copies of the foregoing 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF to each of the following: 
Sharon J. Eblen 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2048 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0929 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 




1. Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, Case 20060693-CA, 
2007 UTApp 214, June 21, 2007. 
2. Order Denying Motion for Review, Utah Labor Commission, 
June 29, 2006. 
34 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
NATHAN H. MERRILL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
VERMAX OF FLORIDA, INC., dba 
DAKOTA CABINETS; WORKERS 




MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 03-0280 
Nathan H. Merrill asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge La 
Jeunesse's decision regarding Mr. Merrill's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Judge La Jeunesse's Supplemental Order of May 17, 2006, explains the background of Mr. 
Merrill's claim and addresses two issues affecting the amount of Mr. Merrill's entitlement to 
permanent total disability compensation. Those two issues are: 1) respondents' right to offset 
permanent partial disability compensation against permanent total disability compensation; and 2) 
respondents' right under §34A-2-413(5) of the Act to reduce permanent total disability 
compensation by an amount equal to 50% of Mr. Merrill's social security retirement benefit. 
In resolving the two issues identified above, Judge La Jeunesse concluded that respondents 
cannot offset permanent partial disability compensation against permanent total disability 
compensation, but can, pursuant to §34A-2-413(5), reduce Mr. Merrill's permanent total disability 
compensation by 50% of his social security retirement benefit. 
In seeking Commission review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision, Mr. Merrill raises only one 
issue—whether §34A-2-413(5) "is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the uniform operation of laws provision of 
article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution." 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Mr. Merrill does not argue that Judge La Jeunesse has misinterpreted or misapplied §34A-2-
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413(5). Instead, Mr. Meirill's attack is aimed squarely at the constitutionality of the statute. It is 
well settled that the adjudicative authority of the Commission is limited; it does not extend to 
deciding constitutional questions. Instead, the Commission must presume that statutory provisions, 
including the provisions of §34A-2-413(5), are constitutional. On that basis, the Commission 
declines to consider Mr. Merrill's constitutional arguments against §34A-2-413(5). 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies Mr. Merrill's motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this Xjl day of June, 2006 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
fl Nathan H. Merrill petitions for review of the Utah Labor 
Commission's Order denying Merrill's Motion to Review concerning 
the constitutionality of Utah Code section 34A-2-413 (5), see Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5) (2005). On appeal, Merrill argues that 
section 34A-2-413(5) violates the equal protection guarantees of 
both the Utah and federal constitutions. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
il2 Merrill first sustained a lower back injury at work on May 
14, 1998. He re-injured his back while working for the same 
employer on April 13, 20 01, and was forced to stop working due to 
his injuries on August 28, 2001. The Utah Labor Commission (the 
Labor Commission) subsequently awarded Merrill permanent and 
total disability benefits due to the injuries, effective August 
28, 2001. As a result, Merrill began receiving workers' 
compensation benefits in the amount of approximately $17 0 0 per 
month. 
f3 Merrill was not yet sixty-five when he became permanently 
disabled and, therefore, was not receiving social security 
retirement benefits at that time. Merrill did, however, begin 
receiving compensation for his injury under the Social Security 
Act in the form of social security disability benefits. 
Accordingly, from the time the Labor Commission awarded Merrill 
permanent and total disability until he turned sixty-five in 
December 2002, Merrill received approximately $1700 per month in 
workers1 compensation benefits and $1100 per month in social 
security disability benefits. When Merrill turned sixty-five, 
his social security disability benefits automatically converted 
to social security retirement benefits, with the amount he 
received remaining unchanged. Overall, since the date of his 
initial award, Merrill has continued to receive unreduced awards 
of both workers' compensation benefits and social security 
benefits. 
f4 Both the Social Security Act and the Workers' Compensation 
Act contain "coordination of benefit" provisions designed to 
protect employer-funded compensation systems from paying 
overlapping benefits. The provisions reduce the benefits awarded 
to an individual under one compensation program based on benefits 
an individual is eligible to receive from another compensation 
program. For example, under the Social Security Act, the sum of 
workers f compensation benefits and social security benefits may 
not exceed eighty percent of a worker's average earnings. See 42 
U.S.C. § 424a(2)(5) (2000). Similarly, under section 34A-2-
413(5) of the Workers' Compensation Act--the provision at issue 
here--a permanently disabled worker will receive disability 
compensation unaffected by the simultaneous award of any other 
benefit for six years. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5). After 
six years, however, section 413(5) requires that workers' 
compensation disability payments be reduced by half of the dollar 
amount of social security retirement benefits received by an 
individual during the same period. See id. 
%5 In August 2007, Merrill will have received six years of 
workers1 compensation benefits, unreduced by any benefits he has 
received from social security. At that time, the offset 
provision under section 413(5) will take effect and Merrill's 
workers' compensation benefits will be reduced by approximately 
$550 per month--half of his $1100 monthly social security 
retirement award--resulting in workers' compensation payments of 
about $1150 each month. Accordingly, Merrill will receive 
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roughly $2250 per month in combined workers' compensation and 
social security benefits, compared to the $2800 per month he 
currently receives. 
H6 Merrill filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission 
on June 7, 2006, contesting the constitutionality of section 
413(5). The Labor Commission denied his motion to review on June 
29, 2006, and Merrill now seeks review in this court. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1(7 Merrill argues that the coordination of benefits provision 
in the Workers' Compensation Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(5), violates Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution in that it fails to provide equal protection of the 
laws because it discriminates on the basis of age.1 "[W]e review 
the constitutionality of the statute upon which the Commission's 
action is based without deference, as a conclusion of law." 
Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). However, "when reviewing statutes for 
constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and 'we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.'" 
Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs. Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 
916, 920 (Utah 1993)). 
ANALYSIS 
1(8 Merrill asserts that section 413(5) of the Workers' 
Compensation Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution and its corresponding clause in the 
Utah Constitution because it reduces an individual's workers' 
compensation award based solely on the individual's age. Merrill 
argues that because section 413(5) is only triggered by a 
disabled individual's receipt of social security retirement 
benefits at age sixty-five, other younger workers who are 
similarly disabled are able to receive social security disability 
1. Merrill also notes in passing that "it could be said that the 
statute discriminates against the disabled in favor of the able 
bodied." Merrill does not, however, provide any statutory or 
precedential support for this position, and we therefore do not 
address it here. See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,117, 17 P. 3d 
1122 (noting that "[i]t is well established that a reviewing 
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed" 
and that "[f]ailure to provide any analysis or legal authority 
constitutes inadequate briefing" (quotations omitted) ) , 
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benefits in conjunction with workers' compensation benefits for 
longer periods of time before the offset provision takes effect. 
Merrill further argues that section 413(5) is not rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest. We disagree and 
uphold the statute as constitutional. 
%9 Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
"[a]11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Utah Const, art. I, §24. 
This provision of the Utah Constitution and 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "embody the same general principle: 
persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if 
their circumstances were the same." However, 
. . . "[t]he different language of Article I, 
[Section] 24, the different constitutional 
contexts of the two provisions, and different 
jurisprudential considerations may lead to a 
different result in applying equal protection 
principles under Article I, [Section] 24 than 
might be reached under federal law." 
Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669-70 
(Utah 1984)). Here, although Merrill asserts violations under 
both the Utah and federal constitutions, his argument does not 
distinguish between the two, and therefore we address both 
arguments under one analysis because Utah's "Uniform Operation of 
Laws provision is, in fact, the Utah equal protection guarantee." 
Wood v. University of Utah Med. Ctr. , 2002 UT 134,f32, 67 P.3d 
436 (plurality). 
KlO Under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution we utilize a 
deferential standard of review unless the statute infringes a 
fundamental right or creates suspect classifications. See 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,1(23, 48 P.3d 941 (reviewing 
an Article I, Section 24 challenge); see also Massachusetts Bd. 
of Ret, v. Murcria, 427 U.S. 307, 312-15 (1976) (per curiam) 
(reviewing federal equal protection standard of review). The 
circumstances here do not implicate a suspect class or a 
fundamental right. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (holding that a 
classification based on age does not constitute a suspect class 
for purposes of an equal protection analysis); see also In re 
Tobin, 675 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Mass. 1997) (noting that an 
individual's interest in receiving workers' compensation benefits 
"obviously does not involve a fundamental right"). Accordingly, 
where no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the 
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deferential standard requires only that (1) the classification at 
issue be reasonable, (2) the legislative objectives be 
legitimate, and (3) there be a reasonable relationship between 
the two. See Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at 1)23 (outlining the test 
used under the Utah Constitution); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314 
(requiring only that classification rationally further state's 
purpose to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment). 
Ull Merrill first argues that there are two basic 
classifications under the statute: (1) injured workers who are 
eligible to receive social security retirement benefits and 
(2) injured workers who are not eligible for social security 
retirement benefits. Merrill contends that reaching the age of 
sixty-five is the only distinguishing factor between the two 
classes, and therefore the statute discriminates based on age. 
Hl2 We begin by recognizing that there is nothing inherently 
unreasonable in distinguishing between individuals based on age 
and that age distinctions have often been upheld as 
constitutional in other contexts. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (upholding mandatory judicial retirement at 
age seventy as constitutional); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 
108 (1979) (finding mandatory foreign service officer retirement 
at age sixty constitutional); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14 (finding 
Massachusetts ban on employment of police officer over age fifty 
constitutional based in part on ground that "old age does not 
define a 'discrete and insular group' . . . . [I]nstead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our 
normal span." (citation omitted)). Because a statute does not 
violate the equal protection merely because the classifications 
made by it are imperfect, see Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316, and 
because Merrill has not established that the classification under 
section 413(5) is inherently unreasonable, we turn to the 
legitimacy of the legislation's objectives. 
Hl3 In reviewing the legitimacy of a legislative purpose, 
the court will sustain legislative action if 
it can reasonably conceive of facts which 
would justify the classifications made by the 
legislation. . . . [W]e do not require exact 
proof of the legislative purposes; it is 
enough if a legitimate purpose can be 
reasonably imputed to the legislative body. 
Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1995) 
(citation omitted). 
1(14 The United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions have 
found that governmental efforts to avoid duplication of 
disability benefits constitute a legitimate legislative purpose. 
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In Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, (1971), the Supreme Court 
rejected a due process challenge to a federal social security 
coordination of benefits provision, similar to the provision at 
issue here, that reduces an individual's federal social security 
benefits if, together with state or local workers' compensation, 
an individual's wage-replacement benefits exceed eighty percent 
of the individual's former salary. See id. at 83. In 
determining that the federal social security provision was 
supported by a legitimate legislative objective, the Court noted 
that "[i]t is self-evident that the offset reflected a judgment 
by Congress that the work[ers]' compensation and [social 
security] disability insurance programs in certain instances 
served a common purpose," id. at 82, and "that a duplication in 
benefits might lead to the erosion of the work[ers] f compensation 
programs," id. at 83. 
Hl5 States that have rejected equal protection challenges to 
state workers' compensation coordination of benefits provisions 
like section 413(5) have articulated a similar rationale. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a provision that 
eliminates an individual's workers' compensation benefits if the 
worker is sixty-five years old, has been out of the labor market 
for at least two years, and is eligible for social security 
benefits or a private pension paid for in part or whole by an 
employer. See In re Tobin, 675 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Mass. 1997). In 
that case, the court found two legitimate legislative objectives 
for enacting the statute: first, "the [1]egislature could 
rationally have enacted [the provision] to . . . prevent the 
stacking of benefits" and therefore halt any "'double-dipping1 
through the receipt of both workers' compensation benefits and 
social security [payments]"; and second, the legislature could 
have enacted the statute "to reduce the cost of workers' 
compensation premiums for employers" who pay into "multiple 
benefit systems such as workers' compensation" and social 
security. Id. at 784. 
%16 Other jurisdictions agree. In Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard 
Services, 937 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn, 1996), the Tennessee Supreme 
Court held that "the [Tennessee L]egislature was attempting to 
serve a legitimate state interest in awarding compensation 
benefits for the permanently, totally disabled employee until 
old-age Social Security benefits commenced." Id. at 861 
(emphasis added). And, in Harris v. Department of Labor & 
Industries, 843 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1993) (en banc), the Washington 
Supreme Court concluded that " [s]tate disability benefits and 
federal old age social security benefits serve the same purpose" 
and that the coordination of benefit provision therefore served a 
legitimate purpose in avoiding duplication of benefits, saving 
money for the state, and reducing industrial insurance premiums. 
Id. at 1066; see also Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 99 
P.2d 1031, 1036 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding a Kansas statute 
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that allows for termination of workers' compensation benefits 
once an employee begins receiving social security retirement 
benefits because "[a]fter retirement the wage loss experienced by 
a worker is not caused by injury, but by retirement"). 
%11 This same rational is further reflected in the leading 
treatise on Workers' Compensation: 
Wage-loss legislation is designed to 
restore to the worker a portion, such as one-
half to two-thirds, of wages lost due to the 
three major causes of wage-loss: physical 
disability, economic unemployment, and old 
age. The crucial operative fact is that of 
wage loss; the cause of the wage loss merely 
dictates the category of legislation 
applicable. Now if a workfer] undergoes a 
period of wage loss due to all three 
conditions, it does not follow that he or she 
should receive three sets of benefits 
simultaneously and thereby recover more than 
his or her actual wage. The worker is 
experiencing only one wage loss and, in any 
logical system, should receive only one wage-
loss benefit. 
17 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law § 157.01 (2007) (emphasis added). 
Kl8 We find the reasoning from the United States Supreme Court 
and other jurisdictions helpful, and the analysis in treatises 
persuasive. In enacting section 413(5), the Utah Legislature may 
have legitimately concluded that the statute would assure 
employees adequate recovery for wages lost due to disability but 
also avoid duplication in benefits by reducing workers' 
compensation awards once workers also begin receiving social 
security retirement payments. Additionally, the legislature may 
have intended to reduce the cost of workers' compensation 
insurance premiums for employers. Thus, we can conceive of at 
least two legitimate legislative purposes behind the challenged 
legislation. 
fl9 Our final inquiry, then, concerns whether the legislature 
chose a reasonable means to achieve its objective. See Peterson 
v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,1(27, 48 P.3d 941. We hold that the 
classification resulting from section 413(5) is not an 
unreasonable means for achieving the legitimate objectives 
discussed above. It is reasonable for the legislature to target 
sixty-five-year-old recipients of workers' compensation 
disability benefits who also receive social security retirement 
benefits because those individuals receive overlapping wage 
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replacement awards for one lost wage.2 Further, workers' 
compensation is funded entirely by the employer, and social 
security is funded by equal contributions from the employee and 
the employer. Accordingly, the classification under section 
413(5) reduces the employer's obligation to pay both one-hundred 
percent of an employee's disability benefits and half of an 
employee's retirement benefits at the same time, thus saving 
money for the employer and maintaining the integrity of Utah's 
workers' compensation system. 
CONCLUSION 
1[20 The age classification under section 413(5) of the Workers' 
Compensation Act violates neither Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution nor the Equal Protection Clause of the federal 
constitution because it is rationally related to legitimate 
legislative objectives. 
f21 Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judgfe^ 
1f22 WE CONCUR: 
^amela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
^Judith M. Billinqs, Judqe^ 
2. Merrill argues, but does not cite any authority in support of 
his argument, that social security retirement benefits are not 
wage replacement benefits because an individual who receives 
social security retirement benefits can still choose to work. We 
disagree. See Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364 
(1946) (noting that "the purpose of the federal old age benefits 
of the Social Security Act is to provide funds through 
contributions by employer and employee for the decent support of 
elderly workmen who have ceased to labor"). Whether a retired 
individual chooses to continue working has no bearing on the 
purpose of the benefits provided under the Social Security Act. 
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